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Statute's Generalized Presumption that a
Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Will Suffer
Trauma as a Result of Testifying in the
Presence of the Accused Does Not
Outweigh a Criminal Defendant's Right
to Confrontation: Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct.
2798 (1988)*
In Coy v. Iowa,1 the Supreme Court expressly confirmed the
right of a criminal defendant to confront face-to-face those witnesses
giving evidence against him at trial.2 As set forth in Ohio v. Rob-
erts,3 the sixth amendment confrontation clause prefers a physical
confrontation. Expanding upon this general position, the majority
found the utilization of a screen, which enabled child victims of sex-
ual abuse to avoid viewing the defendant during their testimony, to
be a violation of the right to a face-to-face confrontation." Although
* In order to reward outstanding legal writing, the staff of the Dickinson Law Review
has elected to publish annually one casenote submitted in the Dickinson Law Review Summer
Casenote Writing Competition. The research associated with this note was conducted by
Barbara Shelley, 1988-89 Notes Editor.
1. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
2. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which
Justice White joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist joined. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
3. 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980), cited in Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court has stated that the confrontation clause reflects a preference
for face-to-face confrontation. Id.
4. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n
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the Court contended that exceptions to this right exist,5 Justice
O'Connor, in the concurring opinion, firmly stated that the right to
confrontation will bow only to those interests shown to be of a com-
pelling nature.' In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court' the Su-
preme Court found that a state has a compelling interest in protect-
ing a child8 victim of sexual abuse from further trauma of
testimony.9 Nonetheless, the Court found in Coy that a state statute
creating a presumption of harm to minor sexual abuse victims does
not outweigh a defendant's right to confrontation."0
In the early morning of August 3, 1985, an assailant sexually
assaulted two thirteen-year-old girls who were camping in the back-
yard of one of their homes. 1 At trial, pursuant to the recently en-
acted Iowa statute,"2 the trial court granted the State's request to
place a screen between the defendant, Coy, and the two girls during
their testimony.'" The screen allowed the defendant to clearly hear
but dimly view the witnesses. As was intended, the children could
not observe the defendant at all."
At the trial level Coy argued that the Constitution required the
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses again him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In one of its earliest interpretations of the
confrontation clause, the Supreme Court stated the purpose of the clause was
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face-to-face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
5. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
6. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7. 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (state statute that provided for the exclusion of the press and the
general public from the room during the testimony of a child victim of sexual abuse was
deemed unconstitutional).
8. The age that is considered to be a child differs among the states.
9. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607.
10. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. "The State maintains that such necessity [to further an
important public policy] is established here by the statute, which creates a legislatively im-
posed presumption of trauma." Id. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
I1. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
12. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987). This section provided in part: "The court may re-
quire a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the
party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see
or hear the party." Id.
A majority of states have enacted statutes similar to the one at issue here in order to aid
in the prosecution of child abusers. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of
Two-Way Closed Circuit Television to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 995 (1985).
13. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1986).
14. Id. at 731.
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court to find that the screen was necessary before giving authoriza-
tion. 5 The trial court denied the objections and a jury convicted Coy
of two counts of engaging in lascivious acts with a child. 6 The Su-
preme Court of Iowa affirmed, concluding that the Iowa statute fully
protected Coy's confrontation right and that the trial court had no
obligation to make an independent finding of necessity. 7 On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case upon
finding the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation violated by
enabling the witnesses to avoid viewing the defendant during their
testimony.18 In so doing, the Court expressly confirmed the defend-
ant's right to physical confrontation.' 9 In addition, the Court held
that a state statute's generalized presumption that a child will suffer
harm from giving testimony in the defendant's presence was insuffi-
cient to qualify as an exception to a criminal defendant's right to
physically confront his accusers.2"
As provided by Coy, the purpose of the confrontation clause is
twofold. 2' First, the defendant must be provided an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness.2" This allows the accused to test the accu-
racy of the witness' accusations before the trier of fact. 3 Second,
and deemed equally as important by the court in Coy, the defendant
has the right to meet the accuser face-to-face at trial. 24 Both of these
protections are to ensure the integrity in the fact-finding process.25
15. Id. at 733. At the state supreme court level, Coy also objected to the trial court's
failure to suppress certain items of evidence that he claimed were obtained in violation of his
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. He further con-
tended that the use of the screen violated his fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial. Coy
maintained that the use of the screen created the same inference of guilt as can prison garb, or
the use of handcuffs. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976). Although the
Supreme Court does not reach these issues, the dissent briefly states that, the screening device
did not "brand [appellant] . . . 'with an unmistakable mark of guilt.'" Coy, 108 S. Ct. at
2810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. at 518). The dissent
reasoned that, "[a] screen is not the sort of trapping that generally is associated with those
who have been convicted. It is therefore unlikely that the use of the screen had a subconscious
effect on the jury's attitude toward appellant. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury to
draw no inference from the device . Id. (citation omitted).
16. Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 730.
17. Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 733.
18. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
19. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
20. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
21. Id. at 2801. See State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Law Div.
1984); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 336 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
22. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801.
23. Id. at 2800.
24. Id. at 2801.
25. Id. at 2802. The majority opinion traced the origin of the right to confrontation to
the beginnings of Western legal culture. Furthermore, it noted indications of a right of con-
frontation existing under Roman Law that conveys that there was something deep in human
nature that has always regarded face-to-face confrontation as essential in providing a fair trial.
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Applying a literal reading of the clause, the majority concluded
"[t]hat face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful
rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound
and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevo-
lent adult. It is a truism that Constitutional protections have
costs."'2 6 The Supreme Court found, therefore, that the utilization of
a screen was an obvious and damaging violation of the defendant's
right to face-to-face confrontation.
Prior to Coy, the Supreme Court had given little guidance con-
cerning the scope and rights surrounding the confrontation clause."
Although the Court in Ohio v. Roberts8 had indicated a preference
for physical confrontation, authorities have disagreed on what lies at
the core of this clause.29 The author of the dissent, Justice Black-
mun,30 along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied heavily upon Pro-
fessor Wigmores' for support. Wigmore takes the position that the
primary purpose of confrontation is to protect the right of cross-ex-
amination. 2 The secondary purpose, the right to face-to-face con-
frontation, is characterized by Wigmore as "dispensable" and, there-
fore, satisfied if the opportunity of cross-examination is present.33
Id. at 2800-01.
26. Id. at 2802. The majority further clarified this profound statement by concluding
that "[t]he Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon
the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclu-
sions." Id.
27. Note, supra note 12, at 1007. The Supreme Court, however, had suggested they
would require physical presence if ever faced with such question. Id.
28. 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980), cited in Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
29. See Annotation, Closed Circuit Television Witness Examination, 61 A.L.R. 4th
1141 (1988).
30. Justice Blackmun, with whom the Chief Justice joined in the dissent, disagreed with
the opinion in Coy on two points:
First, the minimal extent of the infringement on appellant's Confrontation
Clause interests is relevant in considering whether competing public policies jus-
tify the procedures employed in this case. Second, I fear that the Court's appar-
ent fascination with the witness' ability to see the defendant will lead the States
that are attempting to adopt innovations to facilitate the testimony of child-vic-
tims of sex abuse to sacrifice other, more central, confrontation interests, such as
the right to cross-examination or to have the trier of fact observe the testifying
witness.
Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806.
31. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1395-97 (J. Chadbourn Rev. 1974).
32. Id. at § 1396 at 154.
33. Id. at 155. Wigmore calls the witness' presence before the tribunal "a result acciden-
tally associated with the process of confrontation." Id. at § 1395, at 154. See People v. Al-
garin, 129 Misc.2d 1016, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. 1986); compare Commonwealth v. Wil-
lis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986) ("[c]onfrontation does not require live presentation of
evidence" since photographic or electronic presentation will suffice) with State v. Jarzbek, 204
Conn. 683, -, 529 A.2d 1245, 1250 (1987) (rejecting assertion that videotape or television
monitor is equivalent of face-to-face confrontation, since the court interpreted physical con-
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Similar reasoning was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Willis,3 4 where closed-circuit television was
used to take the testimony of a minor victim of sexual abuse. Al-
though a compelling interest was shown by the state, the court found
that "[t] here is no Constitutional right to eyeball to eyeball confron-
tation. The choice of the words 'face-to-face' may have resulted from
an inability to foresee technological developments permitting cross-
examination and confrontation without physical presence.""5 The
court continued by reasoning that "[c]onfrontation does not require
live presentation of evidence to the trier of fact. A photographic or
electronic presentation is not perfect as a substitute for live testi-
mony but it will suffice."3
The irreducible literal reading of the confrontation clause in
Coy contrasts sharply with Wigmore and Willis. The Supreme
Court, however, allowed for the possibility of exceptions in the fu-
ture.3 7 Expanding upon the majority position, Justice O'Connor, in
the concurring opinion, stated that the right to confrontation is not
absolute; thus, it may be overcome in a particular case if a compel-
ling state interest so warrants. 38 The protection of child witnesses is,
in the view of Justice O'Connor and a substantial majority of the
states, just such an interest.89 The Supreme Court's objection did not
surround the screen per se, but rather centered on the overly broad
Iowa statute. The statute stated in part, "[t]he court may require a
party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror
that permits the party to see or hear the child during the child's
testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the party."'40
This statute did not require the state to prove that the device used is
necessary in each particular case. Rather, the statute presumed all
children will suffer trauma from the experience of testifying. As a
result, the Iowa statute's generality denied the criminal defendant
his sixth amendment right to confrontation without requiring the
state to show a compelling state interest. As Justice Scalia pointed
out in the majority opinion, "something more than the type of gener-
alized finding underlying such a statute is needed when the exception
frontation as requiring an "eyeball-to-eyeball" meeting).
34. 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
35. Id. at 230.
36. Id.
37. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988).
38. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 2805.
40. IOWA CODE § 910A.3(l) (Supp. 1985).
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is not 'firmly . . . rooted in our jurisprudence.' "41
In Commonwealth v. Bergstrom,42 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts relied on a similarly broad statute. In this case the
court held that there must be an individualized showing of necessity
on a case-by-case basis to allow for the erosion of the constitutional
right to physically confront one's accusers."' The court specifically
stated that
[ffor Constitutional purposes, no principled distinction can be
drawn between a child witness and any other class when the leg-
islature might in the future deem in need of special treatment.
[This state statute] creates a rule of witness protection that is
too broad to pass Constitutional muster. While we are willing to
consider the validity of new techniques of preserving and
presenting evidence at a criminal trial on a case-by-case basis,
we are unable to uphold broad categorical exemptions from con-
stitutional mandates."'
The Supreme Court reached an analogous result in Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court'6 in response to a mandatory closure of a
courtroom to protect child victims of sex crimes from further embar-
rassment and to encourage such victims to come forward. 6 In this
case the Court held that the first amendment right of access to crim-
inal trials is not absolute, but the circumstances in which the press
and public can be barred are limited.47 As compelling as the state's
interest may be in protecting minor victims of sex crimes, it does not
justify a mandatory closure rule. Such an interest could be just as
well served by requiring a trial court to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether the state's legitimate concern for the minor victim's
well-being necessitates an intrusion on the rights of another. 8
Although the Supreme Court in Coy leaves for another day
what exceptions to the right of confrontation actually exist, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as the dissent, appear to be
receptive to innovative procedures in the courtroom.' 9 Should the
41. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783
(1987)).
42. 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988).
43. Id at -, 524 N.E.2d at 376.
44. Id. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 374-75.
45. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
46. Id. at 607-08.
47. Id. at 608-09.
48. Id. Among the factors weighed in determining the necessity of such a procedure are
the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the
desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives. Id. at 608.
49. "[Ilf a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity, as is required by a number of
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constitutionality of video broadcasts or screens that separate the wit-
ness from the defendant be specifically addressed by the Supreme
Court today, the Court's decision in Coy implies that these devices
would be found acceptable upon the showing of a compelling state
interest. These implications of what the future may hold for child
victims of sexual abuse provide an enlightening view of the evolution
of our judicial system. As the prosecutions of child abuse continue to
rise, these prospective procedures will allow for the equitable treat-
ment of both the traumatized child victims, as well as the alleged
offenders.
Rosalind K. Kelley
state statutes, . . . our cases suggest that the structures of the Confrontation Clause may give
way to the compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses." Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

